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The Public Discourse on Flexicurity:
Reading Greek, Portuguese and English newspapers
Sophia Michalaki, University of Athens
Ο δημόσιος διάλογος για την ευελασφάλεια μέσα 
από τις ελληνικές, πορτογαλικές και αγγλικές 
εφημερίδες
Σοφία Μιχαλάκη, Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Το παρόν άρθρο επιχειρεί να παρουσιάσει το 
δημόσιο λόγο των κυβερνήσεων για την ευελιξία 
και ασφάλεια (ευελασφάλεια) στην αγορά εργα-
σίας, όπως αυτός αποτυπώνεται στις σελίδες του 
ποιοτικού ευρωπαϊκού τύπου. Ο δημόσιο αυτός 
λόγος των κυβερνήσεων έχει ως σκοπό να δι-
καιολογήσει και να νομιμοποιήσει την ανάγκη 
και σκοπιμότητα των μεταρρυθμιστικών τους 
προγραμμάτων. Στην πρώτη ενότητα συζητείται 
η σημασία του (δια)λόγου για την αλλαγή μέσω 
μεταρρυθμίσεων και στη δεύτερη παρουσιάζε-
ται, εν συντομία, η ιστορία της ευελασφάλειας 
και η ιδιαίτερη σημασία του (δια)λόγου στο 
πλαίσιο αυτής. Ακολουθεί η παρουσίαση του 
λόγου σε τρία κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, Ελλάδα, Πορ-
τογαλία και Ην. Βασίλειο, τα οποία δεν έχουν 
κορπορατιστική παράδοση. Η τελευταία ενότητα 
εκθέτει τα συμπεράσματα του άρθρου.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Λόγος, ευελασφάλεια, με-
ταρρύθμιση, πολιτική απασχόλησης
ABSTRACT
The aim of the paper is to present the flexicu-
rity discourse as it unfolds in European qual-
ity press columns, through which governments 
communicate to the public the need and appro-
priateness of their reform program, thereby at-
tempting to legitimize it. Section one discusses 
the importance of discourse to (reform driven) 
change. Section two presents a short history of 
the concept and the policy of flexicurity, dis-
cusses the contents of the flexicurity discourse 
and emphasizes its importance. Section three 
outlines the flexicurity discourse in three EU 
member states with no corporatist tradition, 
namely Greece, Portugal and the UK, as it un-
folds in national quality press columns. The last 
section concludes.
KEY WORDS: Discourse, flexicurity, reform, em-
ployment policy 
0. Introduction1
D iscourse has largely been neglected until relatively recently by social and political science and economics when studying policy making. However, discourse as an analytical framework 
is quite helpful, if not enlightening, when studying the politics of economic adjustment and, 
therefore, the introduction and implementation of reforms. 
The transition to post industrialism has generated a range of new tensions between the 
welfare state and labour market performance, challenging the reform capacity of countries around 
Κοινωνική Συνοχή και Ανάπτυξη 2010 5 (2), 151-171
Social Cohesion and Development 2010 5 (2), 151-171
issue10.indd   151 5/7/2011   5:09:01 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:43:17 |
[152] ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΥΝΟΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ 
the globe. The efforts at the EU level to promote employment friendly reforms, activation and work-
life policies, inspired by the Danish flexicurity model, gave rise to contrasting lines of argument.
The aim of this paper is to present the flexicurity discourse as it unfolds in national quality press 
columns, through which the governments communicate the need and appropriateness, namely the 
legitimization of the reform to the public. In the first section, the author discusses the importance 
of discourse to (reform driven) change. The second section is dedicated to the short history of 
flexicurity and the particular importance of discourse in the context of flexicurity. The third section 
is an attempt to outline the flexicurity discourse in three EU member states with no corporatist 
tradition, namely Greece, Portugal and the UK, as it unfolds in national quality press columns. 
1. Discourse and Reforms
D iscourse has largely been neglected until relatively recently by the policy studies, social and political science and economics when studying policy making. The growing dissatisfaction 
with the limitations of existent theories and in particular with the rationalist mainstream of 
policy analysis has turned attention to language and led to the recognition of the central 
importance of discourse for policy analysis, offering new pathways (of analysis and explanation 
of inertia and progress through change) to the study of the political process. 
Majone’s “Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process” (1989) contributed 
greatly to this direction and shed light on the important role of rhetoric and argumentation in 
the policy-making process and change. During the ‘90s and henceforth, the relative literature 
was further extended (see, among others, Throgmorton, 1991; Fairclough, 1992; Fischer and 
Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Gottweis, 1998; Dryzek, 2000; Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; 
Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt, 2000; 2001a and b; 2002a and b, 2006a and b, 2008 
and 2010; Béland, 2009). Although there are various approaches with their own specific 
priorities, focus and objectives (rhetoric, literary criticism, post-structuralism, democratic theory, 
(new)institutionalism), discourse has already stepped to the fore to make a significant contribution 
to the way policy making is studied, as an analytical framework and a methodological tool filling 
the gap left by existent research practice and analysis.
Discourse as an analytical framework is quite helpful, if not enlightening, when studying the 
politics of economic adjustment and, therefore, the introduction and implementation of reforms, 
mainly the reform of well-established and historically formed institutions (e.g. welfare state and labour 
market reforms),(Schmidt, 2001a and b; 2002a and b; 2003; 2005 and 2010). Institutionalism or 
better, new institutionalism provides different approaches to explaining and analyzing political reality 
focusing on the importance of institutions. Rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism 
attempting to interpret political action through institutions differ, firstly, in terms of the object 
under study: a) rational actors’ behavior, b) institutional structures and practices and c) culture and, 
secondly, in terms of the explanatory logic: a) interest, b) path-dependency and c) appropriateness. The 
explanatory dynamic of institutionalism, however, is finite, because of their deterministic and static 
nature. The major problem it faces is change itself, in particular reform driven institutional change.
The forces of globalization and Europeanization have, indeed, generated deep changes in the 
fields of economy, institutions and ideas. The responses of countries to the rapid economic and 
technological developments though, vary greatly. The reason, obviously, cannot only be the state of 
the economy, the capacity of the established institutional structures or the skills and intellect of the 
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political personnel. To promote much needed reforms and successfully implement them, governments 
are bound by the dynamics of political interaction. The relevant policy actors and the public should be 
convinced to agree on the forthcoming reform initiatives. In every reform, but especially, when the 
narrow interests of large groups or the welfare of entire electorate are at stake, governments face a 
difficult task in their effort to persuade the public and keep the electoral majority on their side. And 
the only powerful weapon available to governments in democratic polities is discourse.
Schmidt adds a fourth new institutionalist approach, namely ‘discursive institutionalism’. 
Discursive institutionalism focuses on the substantive content of ideas and on the interactive 
process of discourse that gives birth to those ideas and communicates them to the public (Schmidt, 
2000b; 2001b; 2002a and b; 2005; 2006a and b and especially 2008 and 2010; Radaelli and 
Schmidt, 2004). This new approach may, indeed, provide for a better view of political reality, may 
offer insights into the dynamic of change and may, also, locate evidence in regard to the factors 
which drive reform and impact on its success or failure.. Discourse, which is defined as whatever 
policy actors say to each other and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a 
policy program, encompasses a set of policy ideas and an interactive process of policy construction 
and communication (Schmidt, 2002b, p. 210; 2008). It provides policy actors2 with a common 
language and ideational framework by which they construct together a policy program and 
agree to proceed to its implementation (coordinative function of discourse). Then, it remains to 
be seen whether the public will be persuaded that the program developed at the coordinative 
phase is necessary and appropriate (communicative function of discourse, see Zaller, 1992; Mutz 
et al., 1996; Schmidt 2002b and 2008). So, through discourse, it is revealed how governments 
manage to consensus for change in policies and institutions and, for that purpose, how they 
overcome entrenched interests and well embedded rights, historically established static and 
obsolete institutional structures and cultural obstacles to change. Discourse sheds light on how 
some governments altered successfully long established policy legacies against cultural values and 
historically established policy preferences, even though, they challenged national values and the 
narrow defined interests of large groups of the population (Schmidt, 1997a and b; 2001a; 2002a; 
2005; 2008 and 2010).
Discourse has its own significant role as an ideational and interactive component of reform. 
Policy actors, through discourse, create an interactive consensus for change depending on the 
way they communicate to the general public and the social partners the need to reform and the 
appropriateness of the proposed reforms (i.e. logic and necessity of the reform program). Moreover, 
not only is discourse considered a means to introduce reforms responding to the challenges of 
globalization and Europeanization, but it also caters for their legitimation. Furthermore, in democratic 
polities, governments have to make legitimate decisions or at least present them as such, in view 
of re-election, which is of major concern to them. More precisely, discourse has a cognitive and a 
normative function, firstly to define the purpose and the objectives of the reform initiative offering 
specific solutions and the policy instruments to implement them successfully and, secondly to define 
the political goals and ideals that are related to the historically formed or emerging national values 
and therefore appeal to the public (Schmidt, 2005, 2006a and b; 2008).
The transition to post industrialism has generated a range of new tensions between welfare 
state and labour market performance, challenging the reform capacity of countries around the 
globe. The EU promotes employment friendly reforms, activation and work-family conciliation 
within the context of a flexicurity model. The next section presents the short history of flexicurity 
and discusses the importance of discourse within the specific context of a flexicurity model.
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2. The Flexibility – Security Discourse 
2.1 The short history of flexicurity
B ig economic changes impact on labour markets dramatically. In recent years, globalization has intensified the competitive pressures and increased the pace of structural change in many 
economies. New technologies bring with them new products and innovative services. Both workers 
and enterprises need to meet the requirements of the current challenging times showing the 
required flexibility. Enterprises, on the one hand, by focusing on the design and the production of 
new innovative products and the supply of mostly high-tech services. Workers, on the other hand, 
are called on to make the best of the contemporary circumstances by the continuous upgrade of 
their qualifications and their readiness and adaptability to the rapidly changing economies.
In continental Europe, the welfare state is of major importance, an instrument for accomplishing 
social cohesion and an expression of solidarity. The welfare state should offer essential protection 
throughout the employees’ working life, assure the necessary income security in order to obtain 
the necessary qualifications to confront the new challenges, help them remain inside the labour 
market, and balance career and familial and social responsibilities.
The EU (European Employment Strategy, Guideline 21, Kok Report, 2004) proposes a congruent 
combination of flexibility and security (of enterprises and employees) in the labour market as an 
adequate model, a policy option, capable of achieving the objective of the Lisbon Strategy: making 
the EU “the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy”. The relaunched 
Lisbon Strategy (2005) focused on the economic growth, competitiveness, employment and social 
cohesion. Its aim was twin, firstly, the promotion of sustainable development and, secondly, the 
creation of more and better jobs. The EU promotes a flexible labour market organisation along 
with a minimum desirable level of security for the employees. The right balance between flexibility 
and security should be defined by and is depended on the particularities of the member states’ 
labour market and the preferences of the social partners.
The concept of flexicurity (a lingual product of modern coinage, a portmanteau of flexibility 
and security) was first coined by the Dutch sociologist Hans Adriaansens in the mid 90’s. The 
Netherlands had a restrictive dismissal system of permanent workers, which led enterprises to hire 
temporary workers on fixed-term contracts. Temporary workers enjoyed low levels of social and 
employment security compared to permanent workers. The aim of the 1999 labour law reform, the 
“Flexibility and Security Act” was to correct the imbalances of the dual labour market, namely the 
inflexible primary labour market and an increasingly growing insecure labour market (Wilthagen 
and Tros, 2004). Flexicurity is based on the idea that both dimensions, flexibility and security, 
are not contradictory, but they are rather mutually supportive, especially in the new reality of 
globalisation (Commission EC, 2006a; Madsen, 2006). 
Since flexicurity is a relatively new term, the related bibliography is not extended and consequently 
there is no single definition of the concept universally accepted. However, there are two main, partly 
overlapping, definitions. According to Wilthagen and Rogowski (2002), flexicurity is a policy strategy 
that aims to enhance labour market, labour relations and work organisation flexibility (labour mobility, 
fixed-term contracts) on the one hand, and employment and income security, in particular of the 
sensitive social groups that are located at the margins of the labour market on the other hand.3
The second definition, as noted by Wilthagen et al. (2003 and 2004), is a more comprehensive 
one and applies, mainly, to the (more successful in terms of labour market performance) flexicurity 
model developed in Denmark.4 Flexicurity is defined as a degree of job, employment and income 
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security that strengthens the labour market position of sensitive social groups (unskilled, young 
and older employees, women, immigrants, minorities etc.) and promotes high labour market 
participation and social inclusion, providing at the same time numerical, functional and wage 
flexibility that facilitates the in time adjustment of labour markets to the rapid pace of the 
challenging global changes, upgrading productivity and, therefore, increasing competitiveness.5 
The central characteristic of flexicurity is the deregulation of employment protection legislation 
(e.g. low level of dismissal protection). It is based, however, on a generous Nordic style welfare regime 
of high social security (relatively high unemployment benefit levels), the activation of the unemployed 
in quest of a new job and the upgrading and the modernisation of skills, through active labour market 
policies (ALMPs) and the continuous and lifelong learning programs aiming first of all at the unemployed 
and secondly at those already employed (Plougmann and Madsen, 2002; Ibsen and Mailand, 2009).
Flexicurity is firstly quoted in an official EU document in the 1997 Commission’s Green paper 
“Partnership for a New Organisation of Work”, where it is stated that the right balance between 
flexibility and security should be the main issue to preoccupy the labour market agents, social 
partners and policy makers. From 2000 and thereafter the discourse on the accomplishment of 
the optimal balance between flexibility and security continues however with no specific policy 
measures and guidelines to be followed in the context of European Employment Strategy (EES) and 
Lisbon Strategy until 2006.
The Brussels European Council (March 2006) calls on member states to direct special attention 
to the key challenge of “Flexicurity” (balancing flexibility and security) and invites them to pursue 
in accordance with their individual labour market situations, reforms in labour market and social 
policies under an integrated flexicurity approach, adequately adapted to specific institutional 
environments and taking into account labour market segmentation.6 
The 2006 Green paper ‘Modernising Labour Law to meet the Challenges of the 21st Century’ 
(Commission EC, 2006c) aimed at launching a public debate on how labour law may evolve in 
order to support the Lisbon Strategy’s objective of achieving sustainable growth with more and 
better jobs in a constantly changing environment. The Green paper brings forth the important 
role the policy choice of flexicurity should play in the successful creation of a sound up-to-date 
and competitive knowledge based economy, whose inclusive labour market would facilitate the 
integration of sensitive social groups. 
The Commission, member states and the social partners jointly explored the development of a 
set of common principles on flexicurity in an attempt to achieve more open and responsive labour 
markets and more productive workplaces. In July 2007 the Commission’s publication “Towards 
Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security” defines 
flexicurity as an integrated strategy to enhance, at the same time, flexibility and security in the 
labour market. The Commission and the member states have reached a consensus that flexicurity 
policies can be designed and implemented across four policy components: a) flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, b) comprehensive lifelong learning, c) effective ALMPs and d) modern 
social security systems. All these four elements combined shall improve total and of sensitive 
labour market groups employment, at-risk-of-poverty rates and human capital.
The 2008 Brussels European Council reiterates that flexicurity helps both the employees and 
employers to seize the opportunities offered by globalisation. Furthermore, since flexibility and 
security are mutually reinforcing throughout the lifelong circle, intergenerational solidarity should 
be considered within all four components of flexicurity.7 In order the targets of Europe 2020 
strategy to be met, at EU level, the Commission will work to define and implement the second 
phase of the flexicurity agenda, together with European social partners, to identify ways to better 
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manage economic transitions and to fight unemployment and raise activity rates. At national 
level, Member States will need to implement their national pathways for flexicurity, as agreed by 
the European Council, to reduce labour market segmentation and facilitate transitions as well as 
facilitating the reconciliation of work and family life.
The Commissions clearly states that social dialogue among the relevant stakeholders is of key 
importance to the development of a comprehensive flexicurity policy. It may lead to the adoption 
of an adequate national integrated flexicurity strategy that would be accepted by policy actors and 
the public, if it succeeds to promote consensus building (Commission EC, 2007; Commission EC, 
2009). The importance of discourse within the context of a flexicurity model is discussed in the 
following section. 
Box 1
The Flexibility-Security Nexus
There are four different types of flexibility according to Atkinson (1984): a) External 
numerical flexibility, b) Internal numerical flexibility, c) Functional (organizational) 
flexibility and d) Financial (wage) flexibility.
External numerical flexibility refers to the freedom of enterprises to adjust employment 
to product demand fluctuation. It is largely defined by institutional factors, namely the 
institutional framework of a labour market. In other words, the relaxation of employment 
protection legislation facilitates the external numerical flexibility that is to say easing hiring 
and firing regulations, adjusting the number of employees to the enterprise needs.
Internal numerical flexibility or working time flexibility refers to the freedom of 
enterprises to adjust working hours and schedules according to their work-load. It includes 
part-time, flexi-time (flexible working hours/ shifts (i.e. night or weekend), working time 
accounts and leaves such as parental leave or overtime.
Functional flexibility refers to the extend employees can be transferred to different 
activities and tasks within an enterprise. It has to do with organization of operation, 
management and workers training. It can also be achieved by outsourcing activities.
Wage flexibility is related to wage adjustment to altering labour market conditions, 
namely to what extend pay and other employment costs reflect labour supply and 
demand. A non-centralised wage bargaining system in which wage levels are not decided 
collectively and there are differences between the wages of workers, increases the 
flexibility of employment cost for enterprises.
Labour market security for the employees, on the other hand, has a four dimensional 
content: a) Job security, b) Employment security, c) Income security and d) Combination 
security (Wilthagen et al., 2003; Andersen and Mailand, 2005; Ibsen and Mailand, 2009).
Job security refers to the possibility of keeping a job with the same employer. It is 
related to the degree of external numerical flexibility. Employment security is dissociated 
from individual job security since it has to do with the ability of being not only in the 
labour market but also continuously in employment during the entire working life. 
Continuing, further education and life-long training systems are important contributors 
to employment security enhancement. They guarantee that the workforce obtains much 
needed up-to-date qualifications. Active labour market policies also contribute to ensure 
the reemployment of the currently unemployed workforce. 
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2.2 Discourse and Flexicurity
Due to its outstanding success, the Nordic flexicurity model, especially the Danish combination 
of a flexible labour market and high social security,8 has been cited by OECD as a role model 
for other European countries (OECD, 2004, chapter 2). The EU (European Employment Strategy, 
Guideline 21, Kok Report, 2004) promotes a combination of flexibility and security (of enterprises 
and employees) in the labour market as an adequate model capable of achieving the objective of 
the Lisbon Strategy: making the EU ‘the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy’ and of the freshly new Strategy 2020 as the optimal means to address the impact of the 
crisis on the labour market.
Flexicurity may be understood as a reinterpretation of the one hundred years’ old tradition 
of social dialogue in the Nordic (corporatist) countries, where labour and capital do not operate 
antagonistically, but rather collaborate. Through social dialogue the state, the social partners 
and other stakeholders negotiate and agree upon the adequate combination of flexibility for 
the enterprises and security for the employees in the particular labour market of each and every 
member state (for the central role of social dialogue to Danish flexicurity model see among others 
Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Andersen and Mailand, 2005; Bredgaard et al., 2005; Keune and Jepsen, 
2007). Nevertheless, problems differ among member states as also do public preferences, due to 
different culture, history and institutional structures (see among others Algan and Cahuc, 2005 
and 2006; Zingales et al., 2006).
Then, what about those non corporatist EU member states, where such a tradition is not well 
embedded and the relation between employers and the trade unions have historically been much 
more confrontational, like the Mediterranean member states, for example, or the UK.9 In those 
(non-corporatists) member states, where the social dialogue tradition is limited, newfangled and 
therefore not well embedded, the governments, in order to launch comprehensive flexicurity 
reforms and ensure the consensus of social partners and the majority of the electorate, should 
promote the communicative function of discourse (Schmidt, 2002a, p.p. 210-1) through the 
public presentation and deliberation of their reform program. Single actor polities, such as 
Greece, Portugal and the UK channel governing activity through a single authority (the elected 
government), statist policy making process and unitary institutional structures (Crewe, 1998; 
Income security is ensured by a generous social security system serving as a safety 
net against unemployment. In other words, it is related to income maintenance, when 
paid employment ceases (i.e. high unemployment benefits replacement rate), in order for 
unemployed to be able to keep their standard of living. 
Combination security allows employees to combine paid employment with other 
forms of civic activities and obligations (family life and social responsibilities, education 
etc.). A flexible organized labour market offers employees the right to temporarily suspend 
their working life (i.e. maternity, educational and sabbatical leave schemes) and then 
return afresh to ordinary employment.
The four dimensions of flexicurity as identified by The European Commission are 
Lifelong Learning, Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs), Modern Social Security Systems 
and Flexible and Reliable Contractual Arrangements.
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Schmidt, 2005, 2002a). Consequently, they are capable of imposing reforms, provided they have 
persuaded the electorate lest people go to the streets and elections are lost. As in these cases the 
coordinative function of discourse is limited, governments may focus only on the communicative 
function of discourse (see first section, p. 2). Therefore discourse could play an important role to 
the promotion of integrated flexicurity policies. 
The concept of flexicurity rests on the assumption that flexibility and security are not 
contradictory, but complementary and even mutually supportive. Flexicurity denotes an optimal 
configuration of flexible labour market legislation and secure social protection. But how much and 
which combination of flexibility and security is desirable and therefore accepted in the specific 
labour market of a member state? Social dialogue, in the context of industrial relations, is the key 
tool for carrying out the main objective of modernising the European social model ensuring greater 
(more desirable) social protection for workers, while at the same time allows the competitiveness of 
the labour market to increase in light of globalisation (the well-known combined aim synthesised 
in the neologism “flexicurity”) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2007; Commission EC 2007 and 2009).
The 2006 Spring European Council (European Council 23/24 March Presidency Conclusions, 
No 31) stressed the need for more comprehensive policies in order to improve the adaptability 
of markets and enterprises. It made clear, though, that member states should launch reforms in 
labour market and social policies under an integrated flexicurity approach in accordance with their 
individual labour market institutions, their specific institutional environments. As the interim report 
from the Flexicurity Expert Group (2007) underlines, one of the main components of flexicurity is 
supportive and productive social dialogue between employees and employers, the social partners 
and the latter and the state, a crucial factor for introducing comprehensive flexicurity policies.
The non corporatist EU member states, where social dialogue is not a well embedded practice 
and the relation between employers and the trade unions have historically been much more 
confrontational, may succeed to legitimise their political action and convince the public about the 
necessity and the appropriateness of the proposed reform plan, counterbalancing, for example, the 
opposition of trade unions through discourse, rhetoric in particular. Discourse could, for instance, 
place emphasis on internal numerical flexibility, on work/family reconciliation and on employment 
and income security (see Box 1).
A convincing argumentation could focus on how precarious a job is, the more an economy 
is exposed to international competition , explaining to the public that due to the rapid pace 
of technological progress it is inevitable (de facto) for the capital-labour ratio to increase and 
consequently to afflict un/less/skilled labour demand and therefore render the EPL practically 
impotent. A strict employment protection regulatory framework may indeed decrease labour 
turnover rate, although Messina and Vallanti (2006) have shown that in the rapidly developing 
sectors of the economy this ramification emaciates. Moreover, it can be argued that a strict 
employment regulatory framework has little positive impact on total employment, no impact 
at all on total unemployment, while it increases long-term unemployment and impedes labour 
distribution. Women, older workers and the new labour-market entrants are the groups most 
affected by strict EPL unlike young and middle-aged men (Young 2003; Commission EC, 
2006; Cazes and Nesporova, 2003 and 2004). The deregulation of EPL would therefore lead 
to the reduction of long-term unemployment and the increase of vulnerable workforce groups’ 
employment. Combined with ALMPs, it could at the same time reduce long-term unemployment 
and contribute to the employment maintenance of those workforce groups most afflicted by 
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flexible industrial relations, directing them towards the more dynamic sectors of the economy. 
Hence, the increased flexibility of enterprises due to the relaxation of the employment protection 
regulatory framework rather than harm, is expected to enhance employees’ security.
Furthermore, governments could overcome negative reactions, by placing emphasis on the 
provision of generous unemployment benefits that ensure worker’s income, security10 in case of 
dismissal. However, it is argued that the provision of generous unemployment benefits weakens 
job search efforts and therefore distorts the labour market. Additionally, the high unemployment 
benefit replacement rate exerts upward pressure to nominal wages afflicting unemployment. 
To limit the aforementioned impact, certain conditions for granting unemployment benefits 
should be determined (i.e. limited duration of benefits, active job search etc.). ALMPs, in turn 
limit considerably the implications of granting high employment benefits (Commission EC, 2006). 
Governments may also underline the important role of ALMPs in a labour market model combining 
flexibility and security as they improve the process of matching job vacancies and unemployed 
workers in terms of time and quality, allocating more efficiently the increased flows from 
unemployment to employment, caused by the deregulation of EPL. Enterprises face problems to fill 
job vacancies with the right worker, especially when there is increased flow from unemployment 
to employment because of the limited number of unemployed (Blanchard, 2000). ALMPs, through 
the retraining programs and employment search services provided, facilitate the matching process 
even in periods of high flows from unemployment to employment, thus helping the unemployed 
to find more rapidly a new job according to their skills, needs and interests.
In addition, governments could also argue that lifelong learning strategies will be introduced 
to meet the employees’ aspirations to grasp new knowledge and know-how in order to evolve in 
their professional careers and reassure that professional learning and training will be provided for 
every worker. Moreover, it could be underlined that workers will benefit from flexible working 
arrangements and working time flexibility as career and family responsibilities can be effectively 
combined. Paid employment can more easily be combined with other forms of civic activities and 
obligations (familial and social responsibilities, education etc.). A flexible organized labour market 
offers employees the right to temporarily suspend their working life (e.g. maternity, educational 
and sabbatical leave schemes) and then return afresh to ordinary employment.
Governments should make it clear that flexicurity is not about less security but another form of 
security that responds to the insecurities related to modern economic and labour market reality and 
that it also provides opportunities for work-life balance., Additionally, they could counterbalance 
social partners’ opposition and gain the electorate’s support by using comprehensive arguments 
that do not contradict national values and culture. 
In the following chapter, I will present and analyse the flexicurity discourse as it unfolds 
in quality press columns. The press is a common communication medium that keeps the public 
informed and facilitates the projection of the views and actions of the government and the social 
partners organisations, as well as of other relevant stakeholders, when there is no well-embedded 
social dialogue tradition or any other long-standing consultation procedure (non- corporatist 
tradition). Press favours the freedom of speech and therefore provides the floor for discourse to 
evolve acting as a mediator between governments and the public, facilitating a communicative 
discourse about the necessity and appropriateness of reform programs.
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3. Flexicurity Discourse unfolding in European Quality Press 
Columns
T his section is an attempt to outline the flexicurity discourse in three EU member states with no corporatist tradition, namely Greece, Portugal and the UK, as it unfolds in national quality press 
columns. Articles are gathered from (The Kathimerini) for Greece, Diàrio de Notίcias for Portugal 
and Financial Times (also references to The Guardian) for the UK. The aforementioned newspapers 
fall in the category of ‘newspaper of record’. Quality, high circulation, non- (evident) alignment 
(with a certain political party), free archive accessibility via internet are the criteria that led to the 
selection of the aforementioned newspapers. The starting point of research, determined by the 
time the words flexicurity or flexisecurity (UK, Portugal and Greece), flexigurança or flexisegurança 
(Portugal) and evasfaleia or evelisfaleia (Greece) make their first appearance in an article, differs. It 
is 2002 for the UK, 2003 for Greece and 2006 for Portugal. 
As I have already argued, it is expected from governments to use (public) discourse (its 
communicative function) in order to persuade the public, the social partners and other relevant 
stakeholders about, on the one hand the necessity of reforms and on the other hand the 
appropriateness of their reform program. As the concept of flexicurity is rather newfangled (and 
largely controversial), governments have to ignore political legacies, switch the perceptions of 
problems and therefore influence public preferences, if they want to launch an integrated flexicurity 
reform according to the incitements of the European Commission. This section therefore attempts 
to shed light on what the flexicurity discourse reveals us about the governments’ efforts in Greece, 
Portugal and the UK.11
3.1 The Greek Case 
The flexicurity discourse in Greece as it unfolds in the newspaper The Kathimerini (The Daily) 
mirrors the reluctance of Greek governments, whether socialists or conservatives,12 to launch 
integrated reform policies, in fear of public unrest and jeopardizing their re-election prospects. 
Instead, they announce the initiation of social dialogue, a not well embedded consultation 
process for the Greek political reality (see among others Kouzis and Robolis, 2000 in Greek; 
Kouzis and Mouriki, 2008 in Greek; Mouriki 2001 and 2002 in Greek). The social partners, and 
especially the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), sooner or later, deny participation 
or pull back and the government, measuring public opposition, either postpones the introduction 
of reform programs, due to major strikes, or implements fragmented and therefore ineffective 
reforms. Note that the Greek labour market is among the most highly regulated and segmented 
in the EU (highly regulated public and broader public sector, a more flexible private sector and an 
extended informal labour market).
Fifty-nine articles from a total of seventy-two between 2003, when the neologism flexicurity 
(flexicurity/flexisecurity, evasfaleia and evelisfaleia in Greek) is for the first time quoted in The 
Kathimerini, and April 2010, are related to a major European event or action (European Councils, 
Summits, Elections, Commission announcements, proposals or publication of reports) and 
published just before, the same day or the day after. The raising of the issue in the media as early 
as , in 2003 should be attributed to the fact that, at the time, Greece was holding the rotating 
EU presidency. It is remarkable that the vast majority of the articles are only of informational 
nature, containing simple references to the flexicurity as a model of labour market organization 
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that combines flexibility for the enterprises and security for the workers without expanding to 
its core. However, there are articles that consider flexicurity inappropriate for the Greek labour 
market due to its high implementation cost (welfare state and ALMPs financing) and the particular 
Greek values and legacies, the cultural differences that impede reforms towards a Danish-style 
flexicurity model. One may read in The Kathimerini ‘…flexicurity is a clumsy attempt to interrelate 
the American lifestyle, the Chinese way of working and the so called European social model’ 
and further down ‘The Danish model may sound a good idea, but there, tax evasion is extremely 
limited and the income tax extremely high.’ (29.1.2006), ‘…we should take into account a major 
cultural difference, the highly developed sense of civic responsibilities and obligations of the state.’ 
(2.4.2006), ‘Do we here in Greece have a strong welfare state, high unemployment benefits, a fair 
taxation system and unemployment less than 5%?’ (14.4.2006). It is even quoted that the then 
Prime Minister K. Karamanlis favored the Irish labour market model (The Kathimerini, 2.4.2006).
The attitude of the Greek administrations in power at the time of these publications was 
almost indifferent; there was hardly any sign of an attempt to counterbalance the social partners’ 
opposition and the public negative reactions about the necessity and the appropriateness of the 
reforms proposed. The seventy-two articles quoted only eleven statements made by politicians 
belonging to the governing parties, six of them by Labour Ministers, two by S. Tsitourides (ND), 
one by V. Magginas (ND), and two by F. Petralia (ND) and one by An. Loverdos (PASOK) in the 
margin of relevant EU Employment and Social Affairs Councils, on the occasion of the presentation 
of the report redacted by the Committee of Experts for the reform of the Greek labour law13 and 
the most recent in connection with the Greek economic crisis. Τhe two former ND Ministers S. 
Tsitourides and V. Magginas embraced the model, albeit reluctantly, emphasizing the importance 
of social consensus and declared the initiation of a relevant social dialogue (The Kathimerini, 
2.12.2006, 30.1.2007, 6.12.2007). For example, S. Tsitourides stated that ‘the only realistic 
rational and socially accepted labour law reform is towards the direction of balancing the needs 
of employers and employees and safeguarding social cohesion’ (The Kathimerini, 7.12.2006). On 
the contrary, the most recent ND Minister of Labour, F. Petralia ignored deliberately the report of 
the Committee of Experts and made it clear that, ‘even though the government is conservative, 
its priority is to enhance the security of the employees, especially because of the financial crisis’ 
(The Kathimerini, 11.6.2008). Note that even though there was an attempt to burke the report of 
the aforementioned Committee because its recommendations were in the context of a flexicurity 
model, the head of the Committee (law professor Ioannis Koukiades) decided to give a press 
conference (22.4.2008) to present the recommendations proposed. The Kathimerini dedicated 
five articles to the issue (13, 16, 22, 23 and 26.4.2008). A. Loverdos as soon as he took office set 
up again a Special Scientific Committee under professor Koukiades. The newspaper quotes also a 
speech of G. Alogoskoufis, the former ND Minister of Economy and Finance at Oxford University 
(The Kathimerini, 19.2.2008). G. Alogoskoufis spoke in favour of greater labour market flexibility, 
combined with better education and welfare financing and R&D investment: ‘There are not many 
countries, with exception of the Nordic ones, ready to accept the high taxation that comes along 
with Flexicurity. On the other hand, in Central Europe and the Mediterranean there is widespread 
skepticism about the labour market flexibility of the Anglo-Saxon model. Reforms should include 
elements from both models. Better financing of the welfare state, more labour market flexibility 
and more emphasis placed on education and R&D is needed’. 
The Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) supports the flexibility component of flexicurity: a) 
the deregulation of employment protection regulation (reduction of the financial cost of dismissals 
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etc), b) the simplification of the procedure and form for concluding part-time and temporary 
employment contracts and c) more flexible working time arrangements (The Kathimerini, 19.3.2006). 
GSEE, the major trade union is opposed to the deregulation of EPL and the modernization of labour 
law in order to facilitate policies in the context of a flexicurity model. Ultimately, GSEE refused 
to participate in the social dialogue process for integrated flexicurity policies (The Kathimerini, 
30.1.2007 and 15.9.2007). The president of GSEE stated that ‘flexible working arrangements are 
a reality in all EU member states and Greece, of course. The main issue is the security of those 
employed under flexible working arrangements’ (The Kathimerini, 22.2.2007).
In accordance with the above findings, it is more than evident that there is hardly any 
sign that the former New Democracy government put considerable effort into persuading the 
social partners and the public about the necessity of an integrated flexicurity policy and the 
appropriateness of the launched reforms, let alone to alter the perception of problems, redefine 
economic interest and influence public preferences. It is notable, however, that former Ministers 
of Labour, S. Tsitourides and V. Magginas, articulated a reluctant pro flexicurity discourse. PASOK 
administration under the burden of the Greek economic crisis may be forced to launch extensive 
reforms in the context of flexicurity. The highly segmented Greek labour market and the increased 
insecurity faced by all those who work in precarious jobs demand reform and certain flexicurity 
policies could work. However the present national economic crisis does not seem to offer the 
appropriate conditions… or may be it does? 
It is at government’s hand to decide, launch and implement labour market reforms towards 
flexibility and/or security in the context of the flexicurity concept. There is no doubt that in terms 
of cultural values and civic attitudes Greece differs from the Nordic member states (see among 
others Algan and Cahuc, 2005 and 2006; Zingales et al., 2006), but the relevant discourse is also 
not at all helpful. If (public) discourse and/or the process of conducting social dialogue ameliorates 
(see among others the relevant suggestions in Kouzis and Mouriki, 2008) and focuses not on 
obsolete perceptions of security that are supposed to promote social cohesion and solidarity in 
an effort to maintain the electoral majority, but rather on comprehensive argumentation (see 
section 2.2) to legitimize much needed reforms, this may help to launch and implement integrated 
(flexicurity) reform plans, instead of fragmented and ineffective piece meal reforms. In fact Greece, 
as a recent report which measures flexicurity achievements of EU member states (Manca et al., 
2010) indicates, has a very good performance in the dimension of flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, while it ranks last for the lifelong learning dimension and at an intermediate level 
for modern social security systems.14 
3.2 The Portuguese Case
Diàrio de Notίcias (News Diary or a free translation: Daily News) is a Portuguese well-known daily 
newspaper being regarded as a newspaper of record. Although Correio da Manhã (Daily Mail), 
another major daily national newspaper, is the most read national newspaper in the country, it is 
considered a tabloid. Therefore Diàrio de Notίcias is a more appropriate choice. It contained sixty-
one articles related to the concept of flexicurity between 200615 and April 2010, eleven less than 
the Greek newspaper, The Kathimerini. Nevertheless, the quality of the communicative discourse 
is, undoubtedly, higher. References are made to experts’ opinions and scientific studies. A paper by 
Algan and Cahuc (2006), for example, is used to verify that ‘The Danish model cannot be imported 
by other countries such as Portugal, France, Greece and Bulgaria. The reason is that the Danish 
model is based on ‘public spiritness’ that does not exist in social and labour market institutions 
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of several European countries.’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 19.10.2007). Furthermore, it is argued that ‘In 
Portugal, social protection is lower than in most of the developed European countries, because 
of less generous unemployment benefits, of their shorter duration period and also of low wages.’ 
(Diàrio de Notίcias, 19.10.2007). On the contrary, there is an interview of Claus Hjort Frederiksen, 
the Danish Labour Minister about the Danish flexicurity model and the way European countries 
should move towards that direction (Diàrio de Notίcias, 7.7.2007). One may read that ‘…it should 
be explained what it is all about. Be realists and honest. It is important to prepare this model after 
one or two years of extended discussion’. 
2007 was the year when flexicurity issues were extensively discussed in Portugal and it is not 
a coincidence that the country was holding the rotating EU presidency at the second semester of 
the year. The Portuguese government articulated a relatively organized public discourse. Vieira da 
Silva,16 the then acting Minister of Labour and Social Solidarity (March 2005- October 2009) was 
the leading voice. Initially, his words revealed reluctance and cautiousness. For example, before 
the presentation of the European Commission’s Green Paper for the modernization of labour law, 
he stated that ‘it will only contribute to the general discussion’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 27.3.2007). 
With time passing though, he favored reform policies in the context of flexicurity openly and 
more decisively. His words were clear, consistent and comprehensive. He even blamed the political 
parties of the opposition that they tried to avoid a flexicurity debate: ‘We cannot have an easy and 
misleading attitude as if the debate over flexicurity does not exist’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 30.10.2007). 
It is made clear that the government’s will was to launch reforms towards that direction at least prior 
to international financial crisis outbreak. As quoted in Diàrio de Notίcias (19.10.2007), ‘If flexicurity 
does not come in through the door, it will use the window. That’s why it is better to regulate it 
than to leave it loose and wild’. The arguments were concrete and in accordance with those used 
by the European Commission. Vieira da Silva underlined that the social model should be reformed 
to address the contemporary challenges. Moreover, he insisted that a flexicurity approach could be 
beneficial for Portugal explaining the benefits of flexibility for both enterprises and workers, stressing 
out that job security is obsolete due to globalization, but that there were also other dimensions of 
security to be enhanced in order employees to enjoy more efficient social security schemes (Diàrio 
de Notίcias, 6 and 7.7.2007 and 19.10.2007). One may read that ‘...there exist various dimensions 
of security that should be enhanced. However, this does not mean more regulated EPL’ (Diàrio de 
Notίcias, 7.7.2007). Furthermore, he stated that policies towards flexicurity are not limited to the 
deregulation of EPL, in an attempt to reassure the unions that the Labour Law reform was not aimed 
at empowering employers and harming employees. As noted in Diàrio de Notίcias (19.8.2007) ‘It 
would be quite simplistic to say that flexicurity is limited to the (revision of the) labour law’. He 
kept repeating there are not fit-for-all solutions. Portugal, like every other EU member state, should 
find the appropriate flexicurity policies according to labour market particularities, mapping out 
its own route. One may read in Diàrio de Notίcias (14.9.2007) ‘A solution that works in a country 
does not necessarily fit all. The common base on which we agreed allows every country to select 
its own way’. The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and the Portuguese national elections the 
following year may explain why the flexicurity discourse began to fade out.
The Portuguese Confederation of Employers was reluctant towards a flexicurity reform process, 
fearing that employers would carry the burden of a potential implementation of high taxes for the 
financing of the security component of flexicurity. CGTP, the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers were also opposed to the concept of flexicurity, fearing, in turn, its first component i.e. 
flexibility, accusing the government for isolating unions from the relevant processes. One may 
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read that ‘The debate over the so called flexicurity started badly! Nevertheless, we shouldn’t have 
illusions, it is an important issue that came to stay…The unions see only the flexibility part and the 
liberalization of individual dismissals, the employers defend themselves against a potential rise of 
social contributions.’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 8.12.2006). They argued, on the one hand, that flexicurity 
would phase out their social rights and, on the other hand, that the labour market was flexible 
enough (20% precarious fixed-term contracts), insisting that more security was what should be 
pursuit. As it was noted: ‘This type of Portuguese flexibility is responsible for the number of fixed-
term contracts used, which already account for 20% of employment’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 19.10.2007). 
Moreover, it was also quoted that there is no tradition of employers-employees negotiations in 
Portugal: ‘…collective bargaining…the particularities of the education system and the dynamism of 
the small and medium sized enterprises are presented as factors of the success of a flexicurity model. 
Interestingly, none of these factors is found in Portugal’ (Diàrio de Notίcias, 29.11.2006).
Even though, the Portuguese government was more decisive than the Greek government and 
stated its will clearly, at least prior to the international financial crisis, it did not seem to persuade the 
social partners. Although the communicative discourse articulated was consistent and the arguments 
used comprehensive, they have not been persuasive enough to convince about the appropriateness 
of promoting an integrated flexicurity reform program. Nevertheless, the social partners recognized 
the need to proceed to labour market reforms. The case here is that the government failed to 
change the public perception of the problem (in/security, unemployment). The arguments used 
by the European Commission were incorporated the Labour Minister’s speech almost verbatim. 
National and cultural values were not successfully incorporated to the discourse articulated and 
new ones did not emerge. For example, the “other” dimensions of security underlined by the 
Portuguese Labour Minister were not incorporated to a discourse about the (historically formed) 
values they serve or, if this is not the case, the new emerging values they bring to the fore, which 
the public should be persuaded to embrace, replacing the old ones. Consequently, reforms towards 
flexicurity were launched in Portugal, but they were piece-meal and incomplete. According to 
Manca et al. report (2010), although Portugal scores in top position in the dimension of flexible 
and reliable contractual arrangements and has a high score on modern social security systems 
dimension, in the pillar of lifelong learning and ALMPs it records a relatively modest performance.
3.3 The British Case
The Financial Times (FT) has published, between 2005 and April 2010, thirty-three articles related 
to the concept of flexicurity, while The Guardian fifteen between 2002 and April 2010.17 The 
articles mirror the distinctiveness of the UK and the distance that separates the British (not in 
terms of geography, but rather in terms of mentality, idiosyncrasy and the way things are viewed) 
from the rest of Europe. There is hardly any statement regarding flexicurity made by government 
officials quoted in FT or The Guardian articles. The vast majority of the articles were of informative 
character. Discourse unfolds in a distinct, nevertheless, predictable way. It seems to be detached 
from the developments at the EU level. As it was quoted in the FT ‘If you are already familiar with 
the term “flexicurity” the likelihood is that you spend more time in Brussels than in London or 
New York.’ (15.2.2007). Note, however, that the French reform initiatives were regularly reported 
especially by The Guardian, providing food for thought regarding the flexicurity concept. 
The Anglo-Saxon model was presented as an alternative to the Nordic model of flexicurity. 
One may read in the FT ‘Could it (the Danish model) be replicated? Substantial tax rises to increase 
welfare support are as unpalatable to electorates as more liberal working practices are to trade 
issue10.indd   164 5/7/2011   5:09:01 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:43:17 |
SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT [165]
unions. Yet the UK has shown that more flexible working arrangements can be achieved where 
there is a dialogue between employees and managements.’ (15.2.2007). It was argued that the 
Anglo-Saxon model is quite successful and effective as the labour market performance reveals, and 
it has to be protected! An article of the FT was titled ‘A streamlined EU must keep British labour 
law flexible’ (18.5.2007). 
The European social model was viewed hesitantly, if not suspiciously and the reforms proposed 
were considered inadequate, too focused on Europe and omitting the importance of the global 
framework. One may read in The Guardian (9.3.2007) ‘In the European year of equal opportunities 
the reform of the European social model is at the top of the political agenda. Tax dumping, 
international competitiveness and the right balance between labour market flexibility and social 
security are the central points of debate. On a general level however, the discussion about the 
reform of the European Social Model suffers from a structural shortcoming: it is too much focused 
on Europe itself and thus omits to adequately consider the importance of the global framework.’
Moreover, emphasis was placed on the long history and tradition of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
The success of the Nordic model was attributed, among other things, to the protestant leisure 
ethic that replaced the protestant work ethic of other times. As it was quoted in the FT (17.1.2007) 
‘Now that Germany has taken over the EU presidency, it may be the right time to reveal the secret 
behind Nordic success. It is not about taxation. It is not about the public sector and has absolutely 
nothing to do with the Scandinavian welfare model. It is all about culture. It is about the rise of 
the Protestant leisure ethic…. So how can the Protestant work ethic help to explain the success 
of the Nordic countries? The answer is that citizens of the Nordic countries are as serious about 
leisure as they are about work. Having a good balance between life and work is considered as 
important as working hard once was. Nowadays, a good work-life balance is seen as a sign of 
being among the chosen ones. In other words, the Protestant work ethic has been complemented 
by the Protestant leisure ethic. ’. 
The prominent argument was that countries (Nordic and Anglo-Saxon) with very different 
laws and institutions have performed just as well economically and therefore they have much to 
learn from each other and not only from a specific labour market model (e.g. the Nordic flexicurity 
model). One may read in The Guardian (25.6.2006) ‘…countries with very different laws and 
institutions have performed just as well economically, and have less wage inequality and a higher 
quality of working life for their citizens’. We have as much to learn from them as the other way 
round. Interestingly, the only elements of flexibility the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Nordic’ models have in 
common are wage flexibility and competitive product markets. But getting people to adapt wage 
demands to circumstance can be achieved in two ways. Anglo-Saxons leave it to the free market’. 
There is widespread fear of the consequences of the over-regulation of the labour market. 
As it was noted ‘The British government has signaled that it is unhappy with draft EU legislation 
that would give Britain’s one million temporary workers the same rights as permanent staff. The 
government fears that the commission is in danger of over-regulating the British labour market, 
which uses more temps than any other country in the EU.’ (The Guardian, 19.2.2002). Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned models have something in common i.e. wage flexibility and competitive 
product markets. The problem rests on the second component of flexicurity i.e. security. Unions 
in the UK started to exert pressure for higher levels of security in the labour market. As it was 
noted, ‘While employers see new waves of EU-inspired employment legislation, the unions see 
the flow drying up. The latter want what Mr. Bradley calls “flexicurity” - European-style security 
in exchange for flexibility, including that of employees to determine their own work-life balance’ 
(The Guardian, 2.9.2003).
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The flexicurity discourse as it unfolds in the British case study reveals that there was absolutely 
no intention on the part of the British government to persuade anyone about the need to launch 
reforms towards flexicurity and in accordance with the recommendations of the European 
Commission. One may read in the FT ‘While this works for Danes, it is questionable whether a 
system based on trust and tradition could be transferred easily to a country with a very different 
history’ (10.6.2005). On the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon model was promoted as an alternative 
model, capable of addressing the challenges of globalization and defending its long tradition, 
counterbalancing the European Commission’s pro flexicurity argumentation. Nevertheless, the 
performance of United Kingdom is quite good overall as Manca et al. (2010) indicate, with its 
highest score being registered in the dimension of flexible and reliable contractual arrangements 
followed by modern social security systems and ALMPs dimensions.18 This result may obviously be 
explained considering the flexibility that characterises the industrial relations in the UK.
4. Concluding Remarks
I n conclusion, the flexicurity discourse articulated by the Greek and Portuguese governments as it unfolds in The Kathimerini and Diàrio de Notίcias respectively lacks of convincing 
argumentation, political vision and apparent ideological influences. Both governments failed to 
place flexicurity reforms into the actual reality of their labour markets and to associate their policy 
reform goals and ideals with the historically shaped values, beliefs and specific preferences of 
the majority of the electorate. In the Greek case, discourse was full of controversies and lacked 
argumentation. It was consisted mainly of statements of intention for or against the concept of a 
flexicurity model. Its limited extent mirrors the reluctance of the government to stand up to social 
partners’ pressures. In Portugal the more consistent and ‘comprehensible’ argumentation of the 
government did not manage to appeal to the public because of the mechanical reproduction of 
European Commissions rhetoric. National values and well established public preferences were not 
incorporated into the reasoning of the proposed reform. The failure of discourse to persuade and 
therefore to promote integrated reform policies towards flexicurity resulted to the introduction 
of fragmented, piece-meal reforms. A more consistent, determined and integrated discourse 
could contribute to the implementation of much needed welfare state and labour market reform 
programs to address the challenges of globalisation. 
However, in the distinct case of the UK, the relevant discourse served to promote, maintain 
and reinforce the long-standing tradition and the historical formed values of the Anglo-Saxon 
model, counterbalancing the pro Nordic style flexicurity model voices.
EU promotes integrated flexicurity policies as the solution to emerging problems and an 
instrument to meet the objective of the, then, Lisbon Strategy and, now, the new Europe 2020 
Strategy. The concept of flexicurity may be familiar to Nordic EU member states and relatively 
easily adopted by member states with a corporatist background. However, in the case of member 
states with no corporatist background and not well-embedded social dialogue tradition, it may 
appear to contradict national values, hard-fought policy legacies and rights based on historically 
established institutional structures and strong time-proofed public preferences. Through discourse, 
governments could persuade social partners and the public to agree on reform programs, only if 
they use comprehensive argumentation that relates the aim of the proposed reform to cultural 
values and traditional public preferences
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Notes
1. I would like to thank the two anonymous referees of the article for their helpful comments. 
Thanks are owed to Nikos Koutsiaras for his critical comments and his valuable encourage-
ment. I thank, also, Panos Kazakos.
2. See among others Haas,1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993 and Keck and Sikkink, 1998. 
3. This first definition applies, mainly, to the Netherlands.
4. See also Michalaki and Filinis, 2009 (in Greek).
5. For different definitions of the concept of flexicurity see Klammer (2004), Keller and Seifert 
(2004), Madsen (2006) and Eamets and Paas (2007). 
6. For the full text see Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions 7775/1/2006 REV 1.
7. For the full text see Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions 7652/1/08 REV 1.
8. In connection with EU’s employment strategy, and in individual EU countries such as Germany 
and France, Denmark has been used as a textbook example of how a member country can com-
bine a dynamic economy, high employment and social security.
9. In the UK, following the anti-trade unionist policies of the Thatcher and Major administra-
tions, and the hostile economic environment, British trade unionism had fallen in size from 
its 1979 peak and was no longer much consulted by governments, leaving no room for social 
dialogue… There signs though that the situation may change.
10. According to Young (2003), in the case of strict EPL, employees exchange the security provided 
by it with the mitigation of wage demands. Although a looser EPL would most probably en-
courage increased wage demands as a means of heightening employees’ sense of security in 
case of dismissal, a generous unemployment benefit system would enhance employees’ income 
security. That is to say the employees shouldn’t be too hesitant to accept a lower redundancy 
level, without demanding higher wages, if the unemployment benefit replacement rate is high. 
Besides, unemployment benefits are an effective means to ensure income security as the par-
ticularity of every case is passed into (OECD, 2004).
11. To avoid any misconceptions, I wish to make clear that there is no pretension of analyzing the 
specific role of the press to the promotion of a flexicurity model, although relevant references 
are included. 
12. Two are the Greek political parties that compete for the formation of government, namely the con-
servative New Democracy party (2004-2009) and the socialist movement PASOK (-2004 & 2009-).
13. S. Tsitourides, former ND Minister of Labour gave the Committee the mandate to make rec-
ommendations in accordance with the European Commission’s Green Paper on ‘Modernising 
labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’ (Commission EC, 2006c).
14. This paper presents the findings of a research project carried out by the Joint Research Centre 
and DG Employment of the European Commission1. The project aimed to develop statistical 
tools to measure flexicurity achievements of EU Member States through a set of four composite 
indicators corresponding to the four dimensions of flexicurity identified by the Commission, 
i.e. Lifelong Learning, Active Labour Market Policies, Modern Social Security Systems and Flex-
ible and Reliable Contractual Arrangements. The dimension of ALMP has not been computed 
for Greece because of missing data.
15. 2006 is the year, when for the first time a reference to flexicurity was quoted in a Diàrio de 
Notίcias article, relatively late in comparison with other EU member states.
16. José Antonio Vieira Da Silva is since October 2009 Minister of Economy, Innovation and Devel-
opment.
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17. I decided to select the two newspapers because of the lack of reliable data, if only one of them 
was selected. 
18. The UK had been excluded in the computation of the lifelong learning composite indicator 
because of problems of missing data.
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